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
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US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
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THE DEFENSE OF JAPAN

by

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Mr. William V. Kennedy

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
FOREWORD	v
SUMMARY	vii
SECTION I. GENERAL	1
SECTION II. OPERATIVE FORCES	2
SECTION III. ALTERNATIVE PATHS OF JAPANESE SECURITY DEVELOPMENT	16
SECTION IV. FUTURE JAPANESE DEFENSE DEVELOPMENT.	21
SECTION V. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES	22
SECTION VI. RECOMMENDATIONS	26
ENDNOTES	28

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PREFACE

This Special Report was prepared by Mr. William V. Kennedy, US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute.

The purpose of this report is to review the current state of Japanese defense capabilities in the light of an ongoing debate about the future direction of Japan's military development. Implications for the United States and the US Army have been identified and recommendations for future US policy toward Japan are submitted.

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FOREWORD

↙ This special report reviews the current state of Japanese defense capabilities in light of the ongoing debate about the future direction of Japan's military development. The author considers five alternative paths which Japanese defense development might take in terms of their advantages and disadvantages to Japan, and their relative probability of adoption. He identifies implications for the United States and the US Army with Japan's probable choice of a regional defense system, a partnership among Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan developed under the protection of US defense guarantees. The report concludes with recommendations for future US policy toward Japan. ↘

This special report was prepared as a contribution to the field of national security research and study. As such, it does not reflect the official view of the Army War College, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.

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SUMMARY

American attitudes toward Japanese rearmament run the gamut from alarmist (another Pearl Harbor?) to resentment ("free ride"). Both extremes fail to take into account the realities of Japanese domestic politics and society.

Current public opinion in Japan, as evident from polls and interviews, now accepts the Japanese Self Defense Forces as part of the national life, but it does not support a major increase in defense spending, much less conscription and the other actions that would be required for return to the status of a great military power.

At the same time, those Japanese who think deeply about defense matters are worried that the declining level of US forces in Asia and the Pacific will leave Japan naked to Soviet pressure or direct aggression, precisely because the Japanese public will not support a major defense buildup in time to protect Japan. This apprehension was expressed by a senior Japanese commander who asked: Does the 1½ war strategy and the emphasis on Europe mean that you are planning for the loss of Japan?

There appear to be five alternative courses of action for Japan. The most likely is that Japan will continue with the United States alliance until it can develop a more independent stance through a defense association with the Republic of Korea and Taiwan.

It is in the interests of the United States to accommodate itself to this trend by halting the decline of US strength in Asia and the Pacific, by committing specific forces to the defense of Japan - starting with US IX Corps - and by actions, including a Presidential visit - designed to show that Japan is, in fact, of vital interest to the United States.

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Section I. General.

1. Conflict of Perceptions.

a. On December 3, 1978, CBS News' 60 Minutes included a report of Japanese defense development. Tom Buckley, a television commentator for the New York Times, saw the CBS report as implying that the Japanese "even now [might] be readying another devastating strike somewhere in the Pacific."¹

b. Two other American observers saw the matter somewhat differently. US Congressmen Richard C. White and Bob Wilson, visiting Japan about the same time that the CBS News report was being filmed, felt that Japan was not doing enough to protect its own territory and its sea lines of communications.²

c. From an entirely different perspective, two Japanese authorities on national defense issues came to equally opposite conclusions. Military commentator Hideo Sekino* declared that the four Japanese Defense "White Papers" issued since 1970 do everything but tell "how to defend Japan, how much defense capability would be needed . . . or how much cost it would entail." Why, Sekino asks, does the Government "not call for increased defense expenditure when it foresees changing circumstances in the near future such as Russian moves in reaction to the Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty?" Earlier, a principal author of those Defense White Papers, Takuya Kubo, said flatly that Japan would not "move toward a big defense buildup in the 1980's" and, furthermore, "there will be no need for it."³

2. Sources of the Debate.

a. Three of the views cited have been present in discussions of Japanese "rearmament" ever since a "National Police Reserve Force" was created in 1950 to replace American occupation forces dispatched to Korea. Someone always has been expressing alarm over the danger of a resurgence of Japanese militarism; others, chiefly Americans, have been saying that Japan is getting a "free ride" by maintaining too small a military establishment; while the predominant Japanese policy view has been that things are just about right. The emergence of the fourth viewpoint--that of a critical body of opinion within Japan itself--dates largely from the fall of Saigon in April 1975, although uneasiness among Japanese who concern themselves with strategic issues is traceable to the initial withdrawal of US forces from Korea in 1972.

*While Japanese names are properly written with the surname first, they appear here in Western usage, given name first.

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b. As reported by Mr. Kubo,⁴ "opinion surveys conducted by the Prime Minister's Office in 1972 and 1975 and by the Defense Agency in 1977 showed that the proportion of people supporting the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) increased from 71 percent in 1972 to 78 percent in 1975 and to 83 percent in 1977. Those who supported the idea of securing Japan's defense under a combined guarantee of the Self-Defense Forces and the Japan-US Mutual Security Treaty rose from 41 percent in 1972 to 71 percent in 1975 Reflecting these changes in public opinion, opposition parties . . . are no longer eager to drive the Government to the wall on defense issues through Diet questioning. Newspaper and magazine articles have come to take up defense issues from an increased variety of angles, but all are based on the premise of continued existence of the SDF and the Japan-US Security Treaty." The Sekino article and others like it, challenging the prevailing Government policy from the direction of a need for increased defense spending are the most dramatic example of this new willingness to consider defense issues "from an increased variety of angles."

3. Implications.

Clearly there is a major public debate in progress about the future of Japan's military (Self-Defense) forces. The manner in which that debate will be resolved is unknown and unknowable at this time. The political, economic and potential military importance of Japan is so great that every effort must be made to identify the alternative courses of future Japanese defense development and the implications of each for Japan itself, for the United States and the rest of the world.

Section II. Operative Forces.

4. Public Opinion.

a. The change in public attitudes cited by Mr. Kubo is remarkable in light of the following:

(1) The formal renunciation of war in the Japanese Constitution (Article 9).

(2) The indiscriminate ideological opposition to anything military among the predominate political, academic and journalistic policymakers of post-World War II Japan, stemming from the sufferings of those groups and individuals at the hands of the prewar military-dominated Imperial armed forces.

(3) The pragmatic judgment of an eminently pragmatic people that the military approach to international problems failed disastrously and should not be tried again.

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(4) The residual emotional impact of privation throughout World War II, devastation and mass death during the latter phases of the war and near-starvation in the aftermath of war.

(5) The culmination of all of the above in a continuing resentment directed toward the reemergent Japanese military forces in the following manner:

(a) Verbal abuse and sometimes physical jostling of Japanese military members who appeared in public in uniform.

(b) Submergence of the uniformed military as a distinctly second-class group within the civilian-dominated Japan Defense Agency.

(c) Rejection by the academic community of civilian scholars who joined the faculties of the National Defense College, National Defense Academy and other military schools. For example, members of those faculties were denied recognition when they attempted to comment on papers delivered at the meetings of academic associations of which they were members.

(d) Denial of access to the popular and academic press by civilian or uniformed members of the military establishment and references to them only in derogatory terms.

b. On 1 November 1978 The Asahi Shimbun published a nationwide public opinion poll with the findings shown in Figure 1.

Support war-renouncing Article 9 of the Constitution	82%
Oppose any change in Article 9	71%
Maintain SDF at the present level	57%
Do not believe the United States will defend Japan in a crisis	56%
Most important factors in the defense of Japan:	
Peace Diplomacy	42%
Economic Power	20%
"Peace" Constitution	15%
Love of Country	13%
SDF	2%
US Military Assistance	2%

Figure 1. Principal Findings of Asahi Poll

c. Despite the dominant pacifist sentiment of the past 30 years, the structure of Japanese society has not changed fundamentally

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from that which supported often spectacularly successful military performance. The samurai remain popular folk heroes on television and in motion pictures. The martial arts of hand-to-hand combat are still widely learned. The organization and discipline that made possible the Japanese economic "miracle" continue to provide a foundation for national military action. All of these are tempered, however, by the democratization of Japan and they will be tempered further by the steadily increasing role of women in Japanese society. Research conducted by a group of US women scholars* during the past year has shown that this probably is more solidly based in traditional Japanese values than the "women's rights" movement in the United States, at least under the initial leadership of the US movement, and for that reason may prove to be far more effective. One result could be a leavening of the traditional Japanese tendency to swing very rapidly from one extreme to another in the conduct of national strategic policy.

5. Geography.

a. The end of the Japanese Empire in August 1945 drove back into Japan large numbers of Japanese who had emigrated to Korea, Taiwan, Sakhalin, Manchuria, the China Coast ports and Micronesia during the previous 50 years. Destruction of the empire also deprived the home islands of the strategic depth that Imperial expansion provided. The result is that 113 million Japanese now live on less than half of the land available within the Japanese archipelago, the rest of the land being mountainous country largely unusable for agriculture, habitation or industry.

b. The geographic position that has enabled Japan to develop a worldwide commerce, also, makes her almost totally dependent on overseas communications. All of Japan's oil comes from overseas sources. Most of the remaining raw materials needed to sustain Japanese industry also come from sources thousands of miles distant.

c. The revolution in military technology that occurred since World War II stripped Japan of the choice that had been hers for millenia in the past and that had been exercised for some 200 years previous to 1854, that is, of seclusion and self-reliance.

6. The Military Threat.

a. Since 1894, Japan has fought three major wars and a succession of smaller engagements with China and the Soviet Union or its predecessor Russian governments contesting control of East Asia. Up until 1941, American involvement in that struggle was

*Dr. Merry I. White and associates. Presented at the 1978 meeting, Association for Asian Studies, Chicago, April 1978.

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largely symbolic. Beginning in August 1945, the United States became a referee of sorts, accepting responsibility for the security and peaceful economic and political development of Japan. This entailed taking over Japan's longstanding foreign policy objective of preventing the domination of the East Asian mainland and the adjoining seas by either China or Russia. As in centuries past, this objective came to be focused on the Korean Peninsula. As stated by Tomohisa Sakanaka, Asahi Shimbun staff writer on national security affairs, "The Korean Peninsula [is] the key to Japan's security."⁵ For the same reasons--because it forms a platform for the projection of power between Japan and the Asian mainland--Taiwan (Formosa), also, was seen by the American military authorities as vital to the security of Japan, as evidenced by the action they took in 1950 to protect both. That is, when faced with dominance of Korea and possible dominance of Taiwan by Asian mainland power, in June 1950, the United States acted to block mainland control of Korea and Taiwan. Although different in political and moral context, these were identical to the actions Japan had taken for the same purpose in the past. The US actions in 1950 successfully neutralized the principal military threats from Asia. US superiority in strategic nuclear weapons clearly blocked any danger of a nuclear attack. At the same time, unchallenged US naval superiority provided security to Japan's reemergent worldwide trade and that, in turn, was made possible by US economic assistance. This situation was so attractive to Japan that she chose to remain closely allied with the United States even after she had regained freedom of choice through a treaty of peace with the United States that became effective on April 28, 1952.

b. Today, all of the military conditions that supported choice of the United States as an international partner are in doubt. As assessed by the current Japanese defense White Paper (1978), "Both in Europe and in the Far East, the strength of Soviet forces now surpasses that of the U.S., and the safety of the sea and air lanes from the U.S. mainland is being jeopardized."⁶ The White Paper assumes that the development of "a mobile MX missile system . . . and the long-range Trident SLBM, along with the development of 'cruise' missiles" will continue to deter growing Soviet nuclear power.⁷ Other Japanese authorities are less sanguine. Hideo Sekino states that "the U.S.-Soviet strategic nuclear weapons balance is likely to tip in favor of the Russians Especially, the possibility that the Russians may possess the first-strike capability . . . [makes] mutual deterrent relations unstable . . . the Russians . . . for both political and strategic reasons are in an easier position to make the first strike than the Americans."⁸ Sakanaka takes a position between Sekino and the White Paper. "The reliability of the U.S. nuclear umbrella is debatable," he says, [but] "it is effective to the extent that no potential enemy could afford to neglect it." The future of Taiwan, says Sakanaka is "unpredictable." In the CBS 60 Minutes presentation of December 3, 1978, LTG Yoshio

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Takenaka, former Japanese Defense and Army Attache in Washington and now Commandant of the Japanese Army General Staff College expressed continuing faith in the US commitment to the defense of Japan but expressed the view, also, that help might be "too little and too late."

c. The 1978 White Paper presents a discussion of the US "1 1/2 war" strategy.⁹ A senior Japanese officer interviewed in November 1978 chose to put this discussion in blunter terms: "You say that you are preparing to fight '1 1/2 wars.' You also make it plain that if the '1' war comes with the Soviet Union it will be fought in Europe. Does that mean you are planning for the loss of Japan?"

d. The present threat, as seen by most Japanese who think about international strategic problems, comes from the Soviet Union. It is graphically illustrated, as in Figure 2, in successive Defense White Papers.

e. A small number of Japanese strategic thinkers are apprehensive that the euphoria accompanying signature of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship in October 1978 will obscure conflicts of interest that could lead to future friction with China. China has not renounced its claim to Okinawa. Chinese occupation of the Senkaku islets just prior to the treaty ceremony suggested the possibility of trouble in the future over conflicting oil claims. At least in public, China continues to support North Korean claims to control of the entire Korean Peninsula. It is precisely this threat of great power influence in Korea that set off the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 and other clashes with both the Russians and the Chinese.

f. All sources the author has interviewed in Japan from 1975 to the present reiterated, in varying ways, Japan's traditional strategic interest in Taiwan.* A few openly advocated independence for the island. Most were more indirect, advocating maintenance of the 1978 status quo, i.e., de facto independence. Expressions of Japanese concern about the status of Taiwan have become more frequent and more open each year since 1975. In June 1978 they reached the level of open expression by the Director of the Japan Defense Agency, then Shin Kanemaru. Kanemaru made it plain that he had stated to US Secretary of Defense Brown during a June meeting that "Taiwan, South Korea and Japan form a community bound together by a common fate. When one of them faces danger, the others cannot just stand idle and watch."¹⁰ Kanemaru was required by the Prime Minister to withdraw that statement in deference to ongoing negotiations for conclusion

*These include not only military sources who might be expected to state the traditional viewpoint, but, also, civilian journalists and scholars of strong "liberal inclination."

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


Figure 2

Outline of Soviet Naval Activities & Military Aircraft Movements around Japan
(SOURCE: 1978 Japan Defense Agency White Paper)

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of the Sino-Japanese peace treaty. In the view of former US Ambassador to Japan Edwin O. Reischauer,¹¹ "The Japanese have this good feeling about China because of the long period during which they had no direct contact with China. The more contact the two peoples have the more likely it will be that the old frictions will recur."

7. Present Japanese Defense Capabilities.

a. Northern Japan is virtually defenseless against a Soviet attack based on Sakhalin, visible some 20 miles across the Soya Strait. Anyone with the price of a railroad ticket to Wakkanai at the north-western tip of Hokkaido and a coin to insert in the viewer atop the Wakkanai visitors' tower and museum can ascertain that the small Japanese garrison manning the radar station there has little more than small arms and crew-served automatic weapons with which to defend themselves.

b. The Soviets have the capability of assembling by surface transport or other concealed means adequate airmobile formations to seize a blocking position along the Teshio River Valley south of Wakkanai and thereby to cover an airmobile assault on Wakkanai itself and an air landing at the unguarded Wakkanai airfield. This operation can be conducted with no more than 5-15 minutes warning, depending on how long the overland communications of the radar station can be maintained.

c. Japanese combat forces are disposed as shown in Figure 3. The nearest fighter-interceptors to Northern Hokkaido are at Chitose. The nearest fighter-bombers are at Mizawa on Honshu. Soviet air capabilities in the Far East Military District are overwhelming. Considering the likely destruction of airfields during such an attack, it is doubtful that units from Honshu and Kyushu can reinforce quickly enough to preclude a successful Soviet lodgment.

d. Japanese naval strength in the northern waters is based at Ominato on Honshu and is oriented, as is the air defense component at Chitose, on defense of the western approaches to the Sapporo region--Hokkaido's capital and the seventh largest city in Japan. Although the quality of ships and crews is very high--a common characteristic of all the Japanese military services--deficiencies in surface-to-air and ship-to-ship missiles make it doubtful that the Japanese Navy (Maritime Self-Defense Force) in its present configuration can successfully challenge the Soviet Pacific Fleet.

e. The nearest Japanese Army (Ground Self-Defense Force) combat units to Wakkanai are those of the 2d Division in the vicinity of Asahikawa. The sort of Soviet incursion described in the Wakkanai and Teshio River Valley district would tie down at least a substantial part of the 2d Division, blocking or limiting reinforcement by the 2d Division of the forces defending Sapporo. Since the Soviets are

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


Figure 3

Deployment of Japanese Self
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capable of surprise airmobile landings on the northeastern tip of Hokkaido as well, from bases on Soviet-occupied islands in the southern Kuriles, the 2d Division would be hard-pressed to hold its present positions.

f. The potential for resistance against a direct thrust against Sapporo from the west is being increased by the formation of an Armored Division combining the present 1st Tank Brigade and the 7th Mechanized Division based southeast of Sapporo. Peacetime stationing requirements, however, preclude optimum positioning of this new force.

g. There is considerable concern on the part of some Japanese officers that a main Soviet attack would be launched against northwestern Honshu rather than Hokkaido. If this were accompanied by decisive Soviet success at sea and in the air, it would be impossible to redeploy the Northern Army--strongest and best equipped element of the Ground Self-Defense Force. Movement of such a force depends at present on a difficult ferrying operation (3 hours in transit, optimum) across the Tsugaru Strait. The ferries are to be replaced by a tunnel in 1982. The tunnel itself will not be easy to close, but its exits will be vulnerable to precision guided missiles.

h. In the view of Osamu Kaihara, former Administrative Vice Minister of the Japan Defense Agency, "In the event the Soviet Union were to attack Japan tomorrow, Japan's air-defense system . . . would be wiped out in about 10 minutes, Japan's maritime fighting force would not last more than two or three days. This is because Japan does not have the arms or the missiles needed for continued fighting with a foreign aggressor, nor the capacity to maintain weapons systems nor the reserve and replacement personnel needed for a protracted war against a foreign invader Japan does not have any unified operational plan covering all of its three branches of service"12

i. Mr. Sakanaka of Asahi states, "due to the difficulty of recruiting good quality troops, the JSDF has never attained its authorized level in terms of numbers of troops"13 Moreover, the armed forces lack a recruiting system to replace casualties in an emergency. The GSDF . . . has only 39,000 reserves Ammunition and fuel reserves are also very inadequate. Officially the stocks of ammunition should provide enough reserves to last for two or three months. However, the ammunition stock of 140,000 tons which was transferred to the JSDF, from the US forces in the 1950's, has now fallen to 70,000 tons and the ASDF interceptors have only four air-to-air missiles per aircraft Japan still relies on the U.S. guarantee to deter a large-scale attack."14

j. In an interview with a Nishi Nippon Shimbun reporter in October 1978, Gen. Shigeto Nagano, Army Chief of Staff, acknowledged

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that the assessment stated in paragraphs a through i above is essentially correct.

k. In July 1978, Gen. Hiroomi Kurisu, Chairman of the Joint Staff Council, was dismissed because of a public statement that in the absence of formal authority to resist, "I have no choice but to train my men to engage in supra-legal action if they are to repel a surprise attack effectively." The firing of General Kurisu set off a national debate. "Does the present law mean," a reporter asked, "that an SDF man cannot shoot back even if right in front of him enemy soldiers land in a surprise attack and shoot and kill Japanese civilians? Does he have to stand by and wait for the prime minister to issue the defense mobilization order?" The Deputy Chief of the Defense Agency replied, "He has no choice but to run. The present law states he cannot shoot back."¹⁵ The government of then Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda announced that it would take the issue under study. According to Takuyu Kubo, former Secretary General of the Japan National Defense Council, "The Defense Agency is expected to take two to three years to complete [the study] but it would be rash to conclude that the study will lead to any actual legislation."¹⁶

8. Financial and Industrial Capacity.

a. Japan has the industrial capacity to arm virtually to any level it chooses, to include development and manufacture of nuclear weapons. Japanese industry has produced in recent years a "family" of armored fighting vehicles and warships of the highest quality. So far, defense production represents only about three percent of Japan's industrial output.¹⁷

b. During recent years Japanese defense expenditures have been held, by decision of the Cabinet, to one percent or less of gross national product.¹⁸ Export of weapons is prohibited. Consequently, because of limited production in each category, unit costs greatly exceed comparable US items.

c. "The idea of apportioning a certain percentage of the GNP to defense expenditures does not in the first place have a rational basis," says Osamu Kaihara, now Director of the Research Institute of Japan, "The important thing is the substance and the quality of Japan's defense capability . . . to decide at the outset to hold down Japan's defense expenditures to within 1 percent of the GNP, without first examining the concrete items of expenditure, and then declaring that Japan's defense capability will be built up within these limits is indeed a strange way of approaching this problem."¹⁹ Hideo Sekino says there are "no logical grounds for

*Elsewhere Mr. Kaihara describes the process as "weird." Weird or not it has many corollaries in Japan's sister democracies.

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setting the limit at one percent."²⁰ Despite this increasing criticism, Mr. Kubo concludes that the Japanese public has not "taken off toward endorsing a stronger defense buildup that requires recognition of a military threat to their nation."²¹

d. Mr. Kinji Kawamura, Managing Director, Foreign Press Center, Tokyo, and former political editor of The Asahi Shimbun discounts a major defense buildup, in part because of structural weaknesses in Japanese domestic finance. Mr. Kawamura cites a Finance Ministry request for an excise tax, stemming from what he considers to be excessive reliance (37%) on bond issues to finance the Government. Short of a major international emergency, he sees no possibility of the Government asking for additional taxes to support a major increase in defense spending. Pressures for improved social welfare and environmental protection preclude substantial transfers within the existing budget.²²

9. Obstacles to Joint JSDF Planning.

a. Although nominally unified at the National Defense Academy and Defense Agency levels, the Japanese armed forces operate almost entirely as separate entities. In short, the fact that most officers come into the system through the cadet ranks of a unified Defense Academy has proved to be no obstacle to development of an intense separate service identity once they enter their chosen branch. At the Defense Agency level, the Chairman of the Joint Staff Council has no authority over the services, nor is there any Joint Staff or Unified Command mechanism for plans and operations.

b. To some extent the slow development of Joint planning and operational command may be a carry-over from the Imperial forces' sometimes deadly rivalry. More likely, it developed because of the lack of any means to conduct Joint operations and training during the years when the forces were struggling to reestablish themselves. While some relatively low-level Joint exercises have been conducted, the first major step toward a Joint command and control system is recorded in the 1978 Defense White Paper: "The Defense Agency has . . . begun study on a 'Centralized Command System' which will collect, classify and analyze information under a single command during situations requiring defense, security or other operational functioning of the SDF" ²³ How far and how fast this will progress in an agency in which the military operators have very little influence is difficult to determine. In the words of Asahi military critic Kaoru Murakami, "It is not unusual to see a civilian official just out of college order around some man in uniform who is old enough to be the young man's father."²⁴

c. Conversations with US military representatives in Japan in November 1978 indicate that only about 16 hours total are devoted to planning subjects in the entire military school system through

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which an officer progresses from cadet through the National Defense College. As with many other areas, the uniformed Japanese military are fully aware of the deficiencies, but they have no choice but to accept them in a system in which all military decisions are dominated by: (1) Legalistic interpretations of the Constitution, in particular Article 9; (2) Economic or financial considerations; (3) Factional domestic politics having no relationship to the international situation.²⁵ In short, criticism that the US military planning process is "program-driven rather than strategy-driven" reaches an ultimate in Japan.

10. Obstacles to Combined Japan-US Planning.

a. All of the limitations applying to the Japanese Joint planning process, or the lack of it, apply even more harshly to any notion of combined planning with the United States or any other foreign country. The fear of arousing latent anti-Japanese hostility in the rest of Asia is still uppermost in the minds of Japanese statesmen and of the entire strata of Japanese society from which they emerge. It is still not generally understood in the United States that a large--and now dominant--part of Japanese society was as horrified by the actions of the autonomous Imperial armed forces abroad as were any other peaceful people. This includes the leadership of the Liberal Democratic Party and of the Socialist Party, virtually the entire academic community and most if not all of the journalists. Thus the firing of General Kurisu over what appeared to be an absurdly obvious deficiency in emergency legislation is seen by many Japanese as a warning to the military that what might appear to be the slightest infringement on civilian authority will be dealt with harshly.²⁶ The governing philosophy and attitudes are expressed in the 1978 Defense White Paper as follows: "Japan takes the view that its Constitution prohibits any role in collective security systems requiring Japan to take action against aggression at allied nations, although such action in defense of Japan's own territory and people is not ruled out."²⁷

b. Far from developing combined defense plans of the sort common to NATO, Japan-US defense relationships for 20 years prior to 1975 were dominated by such basic issues as preservation of the Japan-US Mutual Security Treaty and domestic Japanese opposition to US bases. Whatever the scope of the tragedies following on the defeat of the United States in Vietnam, all sources agree that the effect within Japan was to reduce such opposition to the point where combined planning could be considered.

c. In August 1975, four months after the fall of Saigon, US President Ford and Japanese Prime Minister Miki agreed to begin more meaningful defense consultation. Immediately thereafter US Defense Secretary Schlesinger and Japan Defense Agency Director Sakata met

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to plan for establishment of an appropriate forum. The result was the establishment of the Subcommittee on Defense Cooperation, as an organ of the longstanding Japan-US Security Consultative Committee (SCC). Until then the SCC had dealt largely with broad political issues. It took from July 1976 until November 1978 for the Subcommittee on Defense Cooperation (SDC)* to produce so much as a set of "guidelines" under which combined planning could begin. These now must be approved by the US and Japanese governments. While no difficulty is anticipated on the American side, Japanese military sources anticipate a delay of up to two years before the "guidelines" are approved and combined military planning started.

d. Glacial though this process may seem, it is widely believed in Japan that the United States, for all of its talk about the necessity of meaningful combined planning, is not ready to go beyond rhetoric. Thus the Asahi Evening News reported in a front-page story on November 1, 1978, that "In drafting the guidelines, the Japanese side had wanted to clarify bilateral defense cooperation in more concrete terms, particularly in the areas of ammunition supplies to Japan and the scale of US forces coming to Japan's aid. But, the U.S. refused to shoulder new defense burdens for Japan, and the guidelines ended up as general principles lacking concreteness." Considering the close relationship of the Asahi newsmen with their government sources, there can be no doubt that the judgment expressed in that statement about the quality and substance of the guidelines is an official view.

e. The lack of a well-defined combined planning process has inhibited, but has not prevented some combined Japan-US training and operations. This has occurred chiefly in the Air and Naval components. Army relationships are severely limited by the fact that the senior US tactical headquarters (US IX Corps) is undermanned and burdened by administrative functions imposed by the dual responsibility of functioning as Headquarters, US Army Japan (USARJ). Valuable but limited command post exercises are conducted with Japanese Army units by IX Corps. US Army officers in the USARJ and the Defense Attache Office make visits to Japanese units, and there are visits and exchanges from the 172d Brigade in Alaska and the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii. US Army Pacific Command Support Group in Hawaii has developed an excellent program of international military conferences and symposia in which Japanese officers sometimes participate as observers. The detail of Japanese officers as students at the US Army War College and

*The Subcommittee consists of the Director General of the American Affairs Bureau, Foreign Ministry of Japan; Director of the Japan Defense Agency Policy Bureau; Director of the Self-Defense Force Joint Staff; Minister of the US Embassy, Tokyo, and the Chief of Staff, US Forces Japan.

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other Army service schools also contributes toward maintaining a minimal foundation on which effective combined planning can be built.

11. Summary. The principal factors influencing current Japanese military policy and the current public debate over that policy are as shown in Figure 4.

1. Declining faith in the US defense commitment and capability, conventional and nuclear.
2. Lack of public conviction in necessity to strengthen the Self-Defense Forces.
3. Lack of working system for Joint and Combined planning, training and operations.

Figure 4. Principal Factors Influencing Japanese Defense Policy and Debate

a. Osamu Kaihara, Director of the Research Institute of Japan, warns that the decline in faith in the US commitment and capability shown as item 1 in Figure 4 should not be correlated to the 56 percent in the Asahi poll (Figure 1) who expressed doubt that the United States would come to Japan's defense in time of war. The decline of confidence cited in Figure 4, Mr. Kaihara says, is among those few, but influential Japanese who have made a careful analysis of international power relationships. From his extensive speaking engagements across the entire span of Japanese society Mr. Kaihara is led to believe that the doubt expressed in the Asahi poll results from a much simpler assumption on the part of the ordinary citizen that having fought as antagonists in World War II there seems little reason why the Americans would help out their old foes if Japan only were to be threatened.²⁸

b. It is the contradiction between item 1 in Figure 4 and items 2 and 3 that worry the increasingly outspoken civilian and military critics within Japan itself. If at one and the same time there is doubt that the United States any longer has the power and the will to come to Japan's defense, while Japan itself has not and is not likely soon to correct its defense deficiencies, then it seems likely the Soviet Union will be able to force Japan into an accommodation without firing a shot.

c. Takuyu Kubo and the civilian professors on the faculty of the National Defense College who together dominated Japanese

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strategic thought during at least the last decade, generally have sought to meet this dilemma by wishing away the threat. Thus, the 1978 Defense White Paper, the last one prepared under Kubo's tutelage, reaches an amazing conclusion in regard to the Sino-Soviet confrontation: "The Sino-Soviet confrontation has led to the deployment of the enormous military strengths of these two rival powers along their border areas. As a result, threat is directed toward the inland districts of the Asian continent, rather than toward the peripheral areas. This is an unignorable factor contributing to the military stability of the peripheral areas."²⁹

d. The White Paper estimate is challenged by important sources within the Japanese uniformed services. A view often encountered there is that simultaneously with an attack on China, the Soviet Union would neutralize Japan by threat of invasion and by threatening Japan's overseas lines of communications, thus to remove the threat of interference by either Japan or US forces based in Japan. Much of the apprehension about the US "1 1/2 war strategy" is related to this sort of rationale. Sometimes the question is stated even more bluntly: "At what point do the US forces in Japan become more of a liability than an asset? That is, if those forces are not sufficient to block a Soviet invasion of Japan they only make matters worse by serving as targets endangering the surrounding populations." The question is encountered in American as well as Japanese circles.

e. Despite the "hope-and-a-prayer" aura of the White Paper assessment of the Sino-Soviet situation, Mr. Kubo has warned in the past that the international and domestic restraints on Japanese defense development, particularly as concerns nuclear weapons, dictate that Japan rely on an international relationship for its security. To what extent does the recently signed Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship indicate that Japan has decided to prepare the way for an alternate relationship if it determines that it can no longer rely on the present partnership with the United States?

Section III. Alternative Paths of Japanese Security Development.

12. Introduction. In the succeeding paragraphs, five alternative paths of future Japanese defense development, including the possibility of a military alliance with China, are discussed in terms of their advantages and disadvantages to Japan, and their relative probability of adoption.

13. Alternative I: Continuation of Present Policies.

a. Advantages.

(1) Minimum financial cost. Retention of the 1 percent limitation on defense spending would make it easier to meet internal pressures for improvement of living conditions and movement toward a

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"welfare state" in which many of the responsibilities traditionally borne by the family and the employer are transferred to the government, for example, old age security and health care.

(2) Apparent minimum danger to democratic institutions, as seen by those in Government, the Press and Academe who suffered under the old Imperial military domination and who fear its resurgence.

(3) Minimum international friction with Asian neighbors over fear that Japan is again "on the warpath."

b. Disadvantages.

(1) Inadequate Japanese strength at a time when US strength in the Western Pacific and Asia seems to be declining could force Japan into an accommodation with the Soviet Union.

(2) An emergency stemming from inadequate military strength could precipitate an internal political crisis that would invite military intervention in domestic Japanese politics.³⁰

(3) The present relatively weak military posture of Japan gives it no firm base from which to exert pressure for return of the "Northern Territories" (four Soviet-occupied islands, North-east of Hokkaido in the Kuriles chain).

(4) Inadequate combined Japan-US strength may invite a Soviet attack on China, or may lead the Chinese to believe that resistance to Soviet pressure is hopeless and thereby bring on an accommodation that will give the Soviets a decisive advantage in Asia.

14. Alternative II: Go It Alone. This is defined as a decision by Japan to return to the status of a major military power based on loss of faith in the American commitment and rejection of the alternative international partners, i.e., China and the USSR.

a. Nonnuclear.

(1) Advantages. Virtually none. Survival by a conventionally armed Japan in between a nuclear-armed USSR and China would be impossible, at least at the degree of independence acceptable to Japan. Some modification of the present submarine and air threat might be possible if there was no interference by the Chinese or the Soviets prior to attainment of full capability.

(2) Disadvantages.

(a) Decision to rearm on a large scale would precipitate a domestic political upheaval with danger of a radical outcome, left or right.

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(b) Invitation to pressures by USSR or PRC, or both in combination, to prevent emergence of a militant Japan.

(c) Geographic vulnerability to nuclear weapons cannot be lessened by attainment of any degree of conventional rearmament.

b. Nuclear. This is defined as full conventional armament, plus nuclear weapons.

(1) Advantages.

(a) Obtain freedom of action on a level equal to the United States, China and the Soviet Union.

(b) Enhance Japan's power and prestige in all international bodies.

(c) Provide potentially decisive bargaining power in the Northern Territories dispute.

(d) Decrease vulnerability of Japan by posing potentially mortal threat to any opponent.

(2) Disadvantages.

(a) Difficult to gain time interval in which to develop nuclear arms and delivery systems, free from interference from other major powers.

(b) Certain upheaval in domestic Japanese politics.

(c) Likely parallel race to nuclear arms by smaller Asian powers in particular both "Koreas" and Taiwan.

(d) Trigger search for international nuclear "guarantees" by Southeast Asian nations, intensifying international rivalries.

15. Alternative III: Accommodation With the USSR. This is defined as an arrangement, formalized as a Japan-USSR peace treaty, or informal by which Japan agrees to cooperate in the development of Siberia and to give up its claim to the Northern Territories. It implies a halt to Japanese defense development, and possibly a reversal.

a. Advantages.

(1) Substitution of a Soviet nuclear guarantee in place of an American guarantee that was deemed to be no longer reliable.

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This would enable Japan to continue to avoid the disruptive domestic political effects of a decision to seek nuclear weapons.

(2) Access to Siberian resources.

(3) Protection of Japanese sea lines of communication. This would be particularly attractive if it were perceived that control of distant seas, such as the Indian Ocean, and the waters peripheral to Eurasia had passed from the United States to the Soviet Union.

(4) Soviet assistance in retaining access to Southeast Asian markets.³¹

(5) Soviet support for Japanese oil claims on the continental shelf, and against Chinese claims on Okinawa.

b. Disadvantages.

(1) USSR cannot substitute for US markets which might be lost or damaged as a result of political estrangement.³²

(2) Dislike and distrust of the Soviet Union, stemming from a long history of armed conflict, from what many Japanese regard as a Soviet betrayal in August 1945 and Soviet murder and mistreatment of Japanese fishermen since provide a poor basis for long-term trust.

(3) Acceptance of a Soviet nuclear guarantee, surrender of claim to the Northern Territories and halt or reversal of defense development would place Japan at the mercy of the Soviets in a military sense.

(4) Heavy, unilateral Japanese investment in Siberia would create an economic dependence on the USSR and draw Japan increasingly into a de facto alliance against China.

(5) Increased Soviet penetration of Japanese society through increased influence in the Japan Communist Party.

16. Alternative IV: Alliance With China.

a. Advantages.

(1) Political counterweight to Soviet influence.

(2) Dampening of Chinese claims and potential threat.

(3) Increased access to China market.

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(4) Long-term potential: Japanese industrial and economic power linked to Chinese population and geography could form the controlling world power center.

b. Disadvantages.

(1) Short term: no way to counter Soviet military superiority.

(2) Long term: as China's power increases Japan will be threatened with vassalage, modern weapons and technology having stripped Japan of the protection from Chinese political and military influence once provided by geography.

(3) Overt alliance with China could trigger a Soviet attack to preclude development of a future threat.

17. Alternative V: Regional Defense System. This is defined as a NATO-style defense partnership among Japan, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan developed under the protection of US defense guarantees in various forms and with linkage to an emergent corollary security system among the ASEAN nations.

a. Advantages.

(1) Meets basic security interests of all partners.

(2) Replaces dominant US influence with Asian influence.

(3) Interdependence of NE Asia partners reduces regional fears of "rearmed" Japan.

(4) Creates new power center restraining both Soviet and Chinese power in East Asia.

(5) Potential for neutralization of sea and air threat to all partners.

(6) Strong support in US Congress.³³

(7) High degree of standardization among all potential participants and the United States.

b. Disadvantages.

(1) Immediate opposition from USSR.

(2) Future opposition from China.

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(3) Potential for left-wing opposition within Japan.

(4) Political difficulties stemming from the unresolved international status of Taiwan.

Section IV. Future Japanese Defense Development.

18. Consideration of Alternatives.

a. Of the five alternatives considered, that of a regional defense system under the aegis, at least initially, of US defense guarantees, is not only the most attractive to Japan but is the direction in which she is now headed. A more extensive interchange of military individuals and delegations is taking place among Japan, South Korea and Taiwan than has been reported to date in the press. Two major limitations exist:

(1) The indefinite status of Taiwan.

(2) A continuing legacy of resentment in Korea toward Japan, the residue of Japanese occupation from 1905-1945.

b. Although expressed in different ways by different groups of people in Japanese society, there is a consensus that Taiwan is vital to Japanese security. The most striking feature of this viewpoint is that it is found across the spectrum of the principal political, social and economic groups that now run Japan. For example, an associate professor of psychology at Sapporo Medical College, of decided "liberal" leanings, was as adamant on the subject as a senior editor of Mainichi--of decided antimilitary sentiments. Although muted in 1975, expression of this concern has become more pronounced as the future of the US security commitment to Taiwan was perceived to be in doubt.³⁴ Whether among military officers, civilian scholars or journalists interviewed in 1978, there was unanimity that the "status quo" must be maintained, i.e., an independent Taiwan. In 1978, for the first time, there was a growing belief expressed that, even if US recognition were to be withdrawn, the possibility of Taiwan emerging as an independent republic under whatever name is steadily increasing. This opinion is founded on the belief of Japanese sources with extensive contacts in Taiwan that the orientation of the ruling group in Taiwan and of the general population is now more toward Japan than China, and that mainland China does not now dare attack Taiwan out of fear of alienating the American public upon whom it depends to counter the Soviet Union. In both Japan and Taiwan, however, there is a strong feeling that a regional defense can mature only if the United States provides a strong shield. This includes the belief that the US-Taiwan security arrangement must be maintained "in some form." The regional defense developments now underway probably will continue unless the United States is deemed to have "abandoned" Taiwan.

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c. The Korean viewpoint was expressed in the reaction of a senior Ministry of Defense official to the question, "What are the chances of a regional defense association among Korea, Japan and Taiwan?" "First of all," he replied, "what do you think of the possibility of Japanese troops serving on Korean soil?" To the answer that such chances were nil, he said, "Well, then, so long as you understand that, what about exchange of intelligence, coordination of defense production, and combined military planning." When it was said all these seemed possible the official replied, "I think so, too."

d. Because of the involvement of the United States in the organization, equipment and training of all the forces involved, "interoperability" and "standardization" among the three nations and between them and the United States is estimated by US military authorities to be in the neighborhood of 90 percent, a level that probably never will be achieved in NATO.

e. The defeat of the United States in Vietnam and the announcement of intent to withdraw the US 2d Infantry Division from Korea were undoubtedly the principal influences in hastening consideration of a Japan-Korea-Taiwan regional defense association. Because all the other alternatives are so unattractive, Japanese defense policymakers have elected to continue with the US alliance whatever their doubts about US ability to honor its commitments in a crisis. The sensing in Northeast Asia that the 2d Division is likely to remain in Korea--whether or not it is well founded--has been greeted with a great sense of relief, still tempered by apprehension that the question is not yet fully resolved. Regardless of the degree to which confidence in the US commitment and US resolve can be restored, the long-term "push" has been toward self-reliance.

f. When it seemed fairly certain that the 2d Division would be withdrawn, a panel of Korea scholars at the US Association for Asian Studies annual meeting (New York, March 1977) concluded unanimously that the decision would lead to acquisition of nuclear weapons by the Republic of Korea. If the 2d Division is not withdrawn, the decision to acquire nuclear weapons may be deferred indefinitely. This would head off a crisis in Japan in which alternatives II a, III and IV almost certainly would be considered.

g. If US strength in the Pacific and Asia remains at the present level, it can be concluded that Japan would choose to run the risks associated with continued reliance on the US alliance, while working toward a regional defense association with the Republic of Korea and Taiwan.

Section V. Implications for the United States.

19. US Interests. The following are assumed to be the primary US interests in the Pacific and Asia:

22
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a. (Vital) Prevention of any combination of power in the region that could threaten the survival of the United States. Because such power could be assembled only through voluntary participation by Japan or domination of Japan it is concluded that the maintenance of an independent, democratically governed and prosperous Japan is a vital interest of the United States.

b. (Major) Prevention of war.

c. (Major) Discouragement of nuclear weapons acquisition or use.

d. (Major) Encouragement of continuing economic development throughout the Pacific Basin.

e. (Major) Support of existing democratic societies and encouragement of increased democracy throughout the region.

f. (Major) Maintenance of ocean and air commerce.

20. Implications for US National Strategy.

a. All vital and major US interests, at least in Northeast Asia, are subsumed in the development of a regional defense association that would assure the security of all partners with lessening direct reliance on the United States.

b. In order for such a regional defense to emerge, it is necessary that the United States continue to provide a shield against interference from mainland powers hostile to such a regional development whether in the present or the future.

c. In the words of US Ambassador to Japan Mike Mansfield, "The US Government has felt there was room for qualitative improvement in Japan's defense, but it has not pressed Japan to undertake significantly expanded security responsibilities."³⁵ Every source in Japan questioned on the subject considered the balance described by the Ambassador's remarks "about right" in consideration of the Japanese domestic social and political situation and the international situation.

d. Above all, says former Defense Agency Vice Minister Osamu Kaihara, "You must be patient." In the opinion of a senior US Forces Japan military official, a US policy of "patience and strength" will lead to the strengthening of Japan's role in the following sequence over a period of 10-20 years: "First, defense of Japan; next, cooperation of Japan in defense of East Asian allies; then participation by Japan in the world strategic equation."

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e. The United States can push Japan into a more rapid sequence of military development by any or all of the following actions:

(1) Failure to become "automatically involved" in the defense of South Korea in the event of North Korean aggression, or creation of the appearance that the United States does not intend to be "automatically involved," as in the Acheson speech of January 1950. The status of the 2d Infantry Division remains the key indicator in the view of all sources contacted of US intentions in Asia.

(2) Continued decline in US naval power in the Pacific resulting in confirmation of present suspicions that the Soviets now control peripheral Asian waters and can interrupt sea lines of communication at will.

(3) Failure to deploy strategic nuclear weapons systems adequate to balance Soviet buildup.

f. If "forced draft" defense development is imposed on Japan, the United States must be prepared to accept and to deal with the following:

(1) Domestic Japanese political crises, possibly resulting in radical, repressive government of the extreme right or left, the former more likely.

(2) Action by the Republic of Korea, Taiwan and Japan in about that sequence to acquire nuclear weapons.

(3) A decision that rearmament at whatever level is useless and that a choice, however unpleasant, must be made between China and the USSR as a replacement for the US alliance. Either choice, by its nature, would threaten US vital interests.

g. If the United States chooses the route of "patience and strength" it must accept the fact that only US strength can maintain the equilibrium necessary for a Northeast Asia regional defense system to develop. There is a consensus among US, Japanese, Korean, Chinese and British sources consulted that the following US actions are essential:

(1) Halt the decline of US military strength in the Western Pacific and regain a clear superiority of air and naval strength.

(2) Take action to demonstrate that the United States has in place or can assure timely arrival of the US land combat forces necessary to defeat aggression.

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21. Implications for the US Army.

a. Although not an Army problem alone, the lack of a cohesive US command structure in Northeast Asia reduces the military and psychological effect of what forces the United States has retained in the region. There has been no cohesive US command structure for the region as a whole since the US Far East Command of the Occupation and Korean War era. Lack of an effective command structure was a significant factor in the USS Pueblo and EC-121 incidents. The present command arrangement by which Northeast Asia is lumped together with the Pacific Islands, the Indian Ocean and South Pacific regions suggests that the United States regards Northeast Asia as only one of many essentially co-equal responsibilities. This is one of many factors in what US contacts regard as our "patronizing" or "stepchild" attitude toward Japan.

b. The tenuous status of US IX Corps and the belief that the United States has no land forces definitely committed to the defense of Japan are major factors in generating the current decline in confidence that threatens to undermine the US-Japan alliance. During a visit to the United States several years ago, a high-ranking Japanese defense official told a small audience at the National War College, "We can count divisions as well as anyone else. When we see five division equivalents already in Europe and eight more lined up in the United States ready to go to Europe, and when we see the few, under-strength Army and Marine forces available in the Pacific, we can see very plainly that there is little if anything the United States can do to prevent Soviet occupation of Hokkaido." The decline in US Navy strength since, public statements by active and retired US officials to the effect that the Pacific and Asia will be stripped of forces in the event of a war in Europe, and the tenuous status of the US 2d Infantry Division in Korea, have greatly reinforced these apprehensions.

c. Not the least of the problems generated by the decline of US strength in the Pacific and Asia is an underlying but increasingly explicit belief that the disparity when compared with Europe is based on racial attitudes harkening back to the Oriental Exclusion Act. The fact, as pointed out frequently by Ambassador Mansfield, that "Japanese support for our military presence is comparable to what West Germany contributes to the support of four times the number of US troops," and that an increasing proportion of American jobs and profits depend on a secure and prosperous Japan³⁶ makes the disparity ever more difficult to understand in terms other than attitudinal and emotional.

d. Statements by visiting US defense officials that Japan should concentrate future efforts on air defense and antisubmarine warfare have had the opposite effect from that intended, according

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to both US and Japanese sources. The intent generally has been that Japan should increase its overall defense budget to provide for better air and naval defense. The effect in the domestic Japanese political situation is to create a rationale for cutting down the Ground Self-Defense Force budget to provide increased Air and Naval funds, all within the one percent GNP limit. Even more than the public statements of US officials, the posture of the US Army in Japan conveys to the Japanese legislative audience an indication of the relative importance the US ascribes to the three Japanese services. In this regard, the relatively low rank and status of US Army Japan is a serious limitation on the development of an adequate Ground Self-Defense Force.

e. It can be concluded in general, that a more rational regional US command structure in Northeast Asia and an upgrading of the US Army presence in Japan are essential to restoring confidence in the US commitment and in creating an atmosphere in which a regional defense system can develop during the next 10-20 years.

Section VI. Recommendations.

22. Presidential Visit. The most important single action the United States could take, in the view of all sources consulted, is a Presidential visit to Japan. The exclusion of Japan to date from the visitation schedule, when many nations of lesser consequence to US interests have been included, has irritated thoughtful Japanese. If a Presidential visit were to be made to China before Japan, it would be interpreted in Japan as another indication that China is "No. 1" with the United States in Asia. Visits by the President to such key defense areas as Sapporo and Wakkanai would be important morale-builders for the forces and populations confronting Soviet power.

23. Revised Command Structure. No single action could do more to restore confidence in the US intention to remain a power of decisive influence in the region, and to encourage a regional defense system, than the creation of a Northeast Asia Command based in Japan, to include all US forces north of the Philippines and west of the International dateline.

24. Increase in US Naval Strength. Whether by intention or by accident, the United States has conveyed the impression that the sea lines of communication in the Pacific are less important to US interests than those in the Atlantic. Repeated public statements to the effect that the United States can assure only military traffic in the Western Pacific reinforces the impression created by the "1 1/2 war strategy" that Japan is to be abandoned. In case of war there is no doubt that American perceptions would change very quickly, but if present trends continue that could be too late. Strengthening of the US naval forces in the Western Pacific by at least one carrier task force would help to restore confidence.

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25. Upgrading of US IX Corps. The dual tactical and administrative requirements now imposed on US IX Corps clearly are straining and limiting its ability to perform the full responsibilities of either mission. Further, the vague, undefined role of the headquarters in the defense of Japan, as publicly understood in Japan, introduces a major element of doubt about the sincerity of US commitments. To allay these apprehensions and to provide the basis for effective planning under the proposed Security Consultative Committee Guidelines, the following actions should be taken:

a. Designate IX Corps as the US Army planning headquarters for the defense of Japan and for the reception, control and employment of US forces sent to the assistance of Japan.

b. Relieve IX Corps of responsibility for administrative functions conducted by US Army Japan.

c. Increase the active Army nucleus IX Corps Headquarters in Japan as required to conduct at least two corps-level field exercises annually in conjunction with Japanese forces and US forces sent in exercise status.

d. Provide for support of IX Corps Augmentation in Hawaii as required to support Corps field exercises.

26. Refrain From Gratuitous Advice to the Japanese Forces. In the opinion of all US military sources who have any contact with them, and by personal observation, the Japanese forces are fully aware of their own deficiencies, and fully capable of correcting those deficiencies once the political and fiscal climate permits them to do so. Lectures by visiting or distant Americans can only irritate and exacerbate the existing frustrations. An attitude of "I came to learn and to assist" can have a remarkably good effect. In particular, statements that appear to favor one or the other of the Japanese forces should be avoided.

27. Develop Staff Structures Consonant With the Importance of Japan to the United States. Reflecting the Joint command structure, current US Departmental staff offices tend to deal with Japan as one among a large number of essentially co-equal responsibilities in contrast to Western Europe sections where NATO affairs occupy a large number of officers, full time. Concurrent with development of a more appropriate Northeast Asia command structure, more specific Northern Pacific and Northeast Asia staff sections should be established to use more effectively the area specialists available and to work full-time to assist in the development of a regional defense system.

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ENDNOTES

1. "TV: Popularity of '60 Minutes' Based on Wide-Ranging Reports," The New York Times, 17 December 1978, p. 99.
2. Interviews published in Tokyo Shimbun and Yomiuri, 16 November 1978.
3. See "Guest Forum," The Japan Times, 29 October 1978 (Kubo); 26 November 1978 (Sekino).
4. Ibid.
5. "Japan's Military Capability: Present and Future," Japan Quarterly, October-December 1978, p. 413.
6. The Defense of Japan, (Defense White Paper) Japan Defense Agency, 1978, p. 13.
7. Ibid., pp. 20-21.
8. Japan Times, 26 November 1978.
9. White Paper, 1978, p. 13.
10. Asiaweek, Hong Kong, 11 August 1978, p. 20.
11. Interviewed by the author and the 434th Military Intelligence Detachment, USAR, at his home in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in May 1975.
12. "Japan's Military Capabilities: Realities and Limitations," Pacific Community, 1978 (?), p. 136.
13. General Takanaka, Commandant, General Staff College, disputes this, at least as concerns the Army. In a conversation with the author on 6 November 1978, he said that the Army had been deliberately kept at 152,000 (against an authorized strength of 180,000) in order to transfer the funds saved to development and procurement of modern equipment.
14. Japan Quarterly, October-November 1978, p. 415.
15. Ibid., p. 422.
16. Guest Forum, The Japan Times, 29 October 1978.
17. "The Future of Japan's Defense-Related Industries," Tomiyama Kazuo, Japan Quarterly, October-November 1978, p. 407.

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18. Defense White Paper, 1978, p. 79.
19. Pacific Community, January 1978, pp. 129-142.
20. Guest Forum, The Japan Times, 26 November 1978.
21. Ibid., 29 October 1978.
22. Interview with the author, 2 November 1978.
23. P. 105.
24. Japan Quarterly, October-November 1978, p. 423.
25. "A New Environment for Japanese Security Policy," unpublished paper by Prof. Hitoshi Hanai, Kyoto Sangyo University, 1978.
26. Among Japanese sources who stressed this point during interviews in November 1978 were Osamu Kaihara, former Administrative Vice Minister, Japan Defense Agency, and Kinji Kawamura, Managing Director, Foreign Press Center, and former political editor of Asahi.
27. P. 57.
28. Conversation with the author, November 1978.
29. P. 50.
30. Vice Admiral Ko Tun-hwa, Vice Minister of Defense, Republic of China, observed in a conversation with the author in November 1978, that the military has intervened successfully in Japanese domestic politics whenever civilian administration was seen by the public as unable to cope with the current situation. He considers the present situation to be a long way from such a likelihood, "But many more events like the [1978] Narita Airport riots could bring about a change."
31. There is an important body of opinion in Japan that foresees exclusion of Japan from the Southeast Asian market (now over 20 percent of Japan's export market) if China were to gain dominant political influence in that region. This view was expressed to the author by the foreign editor of the Mainichi Shimbun in November 1975.
32. Tomohisa Sakanaka of Asahi makes this point in his Japan Quarterly article, October-November 1978.
33. Such support was publicly expressed in Tokyo in November 1978 by US Congressmen attending a Japan-US Interlegislative Symposium.

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34. During extensive interviews with Japanese sources in 1975, it was necessary for the author to raise the question of Taiwan in almost every case. By 1977, Japanese sources invariably brought up the matter without prompting, linked to Korea in their expressions of concern.

35. From a speech to the Southeast United States-Japan Association, Orlando, Florida, October 1978, as reported by The Asahi Evening News, 1 November 1978, p. 1.

36. David Rockefeller, Chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank, told a press conference in Tokyo on November 13, 1978, that 65 percent of Chase's earnings come from Asia. (Mainichi Daily News, 14 November 1978, p. 1).

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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) This special report reviews the current state of Japanese defense capabilities in light of the ongoing debate about the future direction of Japan's military development. The author considers five alternative paths which Japanese defense development might take in terms of their advantages and disadvantages to Japan, and their relative probability of adoption. He identifies implications for the United States and the US Army with Japan's probable choice of a regional defense system, a partnership among Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan developed		

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under the protection of US defense guarantees. The report concludes with recommendations for future US policy toward Japan.

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